PublicationsPublikacije
Parliamentary Inquiry in Montenegro
Oversight Tool Lacking Political Support
The constitutional provision for proposing and implementing parliamentary inquiries in Montenegro is scarcely ever applied. In the last ten years, this oversight tool has not been used, while the proposal for opening parliamentary inquiry was submitted only in two occasions from the adoption of the current Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, regulating the parliamentary inquires issue.
In Montenegro, the opening of parliamentary inquiries suffers from the lack of both the political will of parliamentary majority and the opposition’s confidence in its effectiveness. Furthermore, the opposition is not unanimous in using this tool. Normative gaps in the current regulation of parliamentary inquiries in Montenegro are additionally overburdening the overall situation. In implementing parliamentary inquires, the Inquiry Committee might be confronted with difficulties in reference to the data collection, due to: imprecisely defined investigative competences; inability to access classified information; absence of legal obligation of government officials, civil servants and other persons to be heard before the Committee, under the threat of imposing sanctions for the failure to respond and perjury.
Unlike Montenegro, opting for regulating the parliamentary inquiry issue by the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, a vast majority of the EU countries have adopted an umbrella law, commonly the special Law on Parliamentary Inquiries. The establishment of a special legal framework governing this oversight tool aims at its strengthening, as well as guaranteeing the absolute obligation of adhering to the legal provisions regulating this issue. The adoption of a special Law in Montenegro would result in regulating specific issues related to the scope of work and actions of the Inquiry Committee, as well as the penalty provisions, enabling adequate implementation of this tool in practice.
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Law on Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Defense Sector
- First Year of Implementation -
2011 Monitoring Report
The Law on Parliamentary Oversight of Defense and Security Sector was unanimously adopted by the Parliament of Montenegro in December 2010, after nearly three years since the conception of idea of the need for its adoption. The basic objective of the Law was to enable the Parliament of Montenegro, directly through the Committee for Defense and Security conducting the oversight of authorities in charge of security and defense, to ensure the protection of citizens’ freedoms and rights against possible abuse, as well as to contribute to the development of a comprehensive and modern security system of Montenegro. The Law specifies the manner of conducting parliamentary oversight of actions of authorities and institutions dealing with the security and defense issues, their duties, as well as the relationship of the Committee for Defense and Security to the Parliament and Government of Montenegro.
The authors of this paper endeavored in providing an objective and comprehensive overview of the work of both the Parliament and the Committee for Defense and Security in 2011, being important as the first year of implementation of the Law on Parliamentary Oversight of Defense and Security Sector. The scope of this paper is not limited to the numbers and statistical data, and it simultaneously represents an overview of meeting the key competences defined by the Law and Rules of Procedures of the Parliament. Furthermore, the objective of the paper is to underline the problems encountered in the parliamentary oversight functioning, as well as to emphasize that the Law has failed in thoroughly addressing certain issues that the authors of this paper have raised during its development.
With this paper, the Institute Alternative aims at strengthening the discussion and public dialogue tradition in reference to the work of the Committee for Defense and Security and, generally, the functioning of the parliamentary oversight of the defense and security sector. This is the first in a series of annual reports through which we will endeavor in developing the oversight methodology of both the Parliament and the Committee in reference to this issue, benchmarking the fulfillment of the legal provisions, and finally to assist in the process of planning the parliamentary oversight performance.
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Montenegro under the watchful eyes of Đukanović and EU
Change is coming to Montenegro slowly, laboriously and unwillingly. The fact that Igor Lukšić is the Prime Minister is still less relevant than the fact that Milo Đukanović, who is not a Prime Minister, remains politically the most important and influential person in the country.
The new Prime Minister introduced the practice of communicating and cooperating with the opposition, non-governmental actors and other representatives of the society. He also demonstrated a new political sensibility in his approach to social problems, his attitude, and his work methods. Yet, his premiership remains in Đukanović’s shadow. In this context, it is unclear whether Lukšić is at all trying to achieve a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, and when could that happen.
The process of European integrations, i.e. the principle of conditionality, is the key factor in accelerating reforms. Without a strong influence of the international community (EU and USA), in synergy with a strengthening role for independent and professional media and NGOs, reforms whose pace would depend on the Government alone would be doomed to stagnate. This much is evident from the intensity of the reform efforts undertaken, albeit mostly in the legal sphere, in an extremely short period under the pressure of living up to the seven recommendations of the European Commission.
With the same people in government for so long, the line separating the leading DPS party from the state itself disappeared. Consequently, regular institutions, norms and practices are not functioning or are doing very poorly in a political context that had been frozen for decades. The most obvious examples of poor results concern the fight against corruption and development of a professional public administration – two areas that are fundamental to the structure of political elite
Major decisions which are crucial for further economic development of Montenegro are delayed or avoided altogether, and the Government failed to rally public support for its proposals and make the citizens believe in transparency and accountability of these processes.
There is much internal struggle within DPS, gradually pitting Đukanović on the one side against Marović and Vujanović on the other. On the surface, the most obvious differences concern identity issues, with Ranko Krivokapić, president of SDP, acting as an explicit interpreter of the politics of the president of DPS. In the meantime, the internal (interest-based) chasms are deepening, threatening to undermine the DPS monolith in the medium term.
While some expect these tensions in DPS’ leadership to soon erupt to the surface, it is still too early to talk about divisions and splits from the party, although it is almost certain that some changes are to take place in the near future.
The opposition is still doing little in terms of organisational and strategic moves to improve its capacities. Public opinion trends suggest that DPS’ popularity continued to grow, while that of the opposition declined slightly, alongside a growing population of non-voters.
Parliamentary elections could take place in autumn 2012. An earlier date would interfere with the demanding six-month monitoring period of the European Commission in expectation of the final opening of accession talks with EU.
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The Montenegrin parlament in the process of EU integration
Montenegro gained candidate status for EU membership in December 2010. The European Commission’s opinion on Montenegro’s application for membership in the EU outlines seven key priorities which need to be dealt with by the authorities in order for the EU accession negotiations to start. One of these seven key priorities is “strengthening the Parliament’s legislative and oversight role”.
The Parliament of Montenegro should have a more active role than it had in the hitherto process of European integration. Therefore, it is necessary to enhance its role at three levels:
1) Redefining the role of the National Council for European Integration (NCEI);
2) Enhancing administrative capacities within all parliamentary bodies, especially the Committee for International Relations and European Integration;
3) Strengthening of the parliamentary oversight mechanisms, which are inadequately regulated by the Rules of Procedure and poorly implemented in practice.
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Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) in Montenegro
As a candidate country for joining the European Union, Montenegro has the obligation to harmonize its overall legislation with the EU Acquis. Having in mind that there is a significant number of existing laws that have to be amended, as well as those that are yet to be adopted, the state administration has to undergo a comprehensive reform in order to meet the challenge. Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) is one of the mechanisms that will be of great significance for the process of diminishing administrative ballast.
RIA is a method which is used in harmonizing laws and bylaws, indicating financial and material impact that the new legislation will have. It is applied before the law is adopted. This concept has been introduced in the USA, while its use on the European soil has been increasing ever since 2003, when it was implemented on the EU level. Unlike the countries of the region (Serbia and Macedonia) where RIA is applied only to draft laws, in Montenegro RIA will be applied to bylaws as well.
The purpose of this policy brief is to explain the concept of RIA, its significance and the practice of the countries of the region in its implementation. It will explain the challenges that our Government may face while implementing RIA. This brief also tries to open up a public debate about the benefits and effects that the implementation of this mechanism will have.
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Control of the local self-governments’ budget
The annual expenditure of local self-governments exceeds 250 million Euros. Having in mind the annual amount of local self-government expenditure in Montenegro, adequate oversight of planning, execution and audit of local budgets is indisputably significant.
In order to provide an overview of the existing mechanisms for budgetary oversight at the local level, this analysis will offer an overview of both the legal framework and the practice of planning, execution and audit of local budgets in four selected Montenegrin municipalities: Nikšić, Danilovgrad, Podgorica and Herceg Novi.
The annual budget execution statements of Nikšić, Danilovgrad and Herceg Novi municipalities were audited by the State Audit Institution (SAI). This was the reason for the selection of these cases for this research, as it will help us to determine how SAI reports help to improve budgetary oversight. The capital City Podgorica has been selected in light of several issues: the amount of budgetary resources, the amount of resources allocated for capital investment, and the numerous debates reported by the media in relation to Podgorica’s budget.
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The State Audit Institution in Montenegro
External audit of the public sector is one of the main instruments used to strengthen the responsibility of the public authorities and raise general public trust in public sector. Its primary goal is to give full and exact report on regularity of use of the public funds, but also to show whether the institutions that are users of the public funds managed to meat goals they had been given funds for.
State Audit Institution (SAI) is independent and supreme authority of the state audit established by the Law on State Audit Institution in April 2004. It is institutional, external, independent, professional and impartial control of the budget expenditures and state property management in Montenegro. SAI issued 46 audit reports so far: six reports on the Final Statement of the Budget of Montenegro and the rest on individual audits. With enlargement of the SAI’s capacities and implementation of demanding new audits, the total number of audits steadily grows with every year.
Members of the Parliament, representatives of the executive authorities and international organizations often publicly compliment the SAI and its work. There hasn’t been significant contribution to the work of SAI by the NGOs in Montenegro so far.
Taking all stated facts into account, our opinion is that it is time to give more objective review of the SAI’s work so far, its position in institutional framework, ways other authorities use the conclusions of this institution and last but now least the over whole results of its work so far. Institute Alternative (IA), with the support of the European Fund for the Balkans, conducted the project “Towards the best EU practice: Strengthening the Influence of the External Financial Control in Montenegro”. Project includes analysis of the legal framework of the financial control, capacity of the State Audit Institution (SAI) and the quality of the inter-institutional cooperation. The goal of the project and this publication as its direct product, is to provide recommendations whose implementation could lead to the improvement of SAI’s work and thus its influence on the system of public finance.
The materials used for this investigative report are the conclusions from the interviews conducted with representatives of the audited entities, SAI, Ministry of Finance, the State Prosecutor’s Office, Public Procurement Directorate, District Authority for offenses Podgorica and Members of Parliament Committee on Economy, Finance and Budget. We also used press clipping materials and articles on SAI from the print media IA have been collecting over the past years . We have taken into account the comparison with the practice and the legal framework of the state audit institutions in selected countries in this region (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia). During the research we made a constructive cooperation with the SAI and issued basic questionnaire consisting of thirty questions and a demand for gaining access to the information, and interviewed Heads of the Sectors.
This analysis contains the recommendations mainly issued to the SAI, but also to the other members of the process of control of the public expenditures in Montenegro. Beside its main goal to influence the accountable decision makers to implement new solutions into a legal framework and practice, this analysis should contribute to the number of works on external audit in Montenegro.
It is a good opportunity to solve certain issues that posed a great burden to the work of the SAI before the upcoming amendments to the Law on State Audit Institution planned for 2011. The importance of further efforts on strengthening the capacities of SAI was also highlighted by the European Commission in the Opinion on the Application of Montenegro for Membership of the European Union as one of the seven key priorities to be fulfilled if Montenegro is to start accession negotiations.
(Click on the photograph above to download the publication in .pdf)
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Report on democratic oversight of security services
Institute Alternative prepared a translation of the Council of Europe’s (Venice Commission) “Report on democratic oversight of security services”, aiming to distribute it to stakeholders, MPs, representatives of the security and defense sector institutions and all interested parties. This publication will contribute to the presently poor basis of translated papers and academic works on the topic of democratic oversight in Montenegro. It was Institute Alternative’s aim to encourage a more competent public and professional debate concerning this important issue for further development of democracy and human rights, accountability and transparency of public institutions.
This publication was prepared in the framework of the project “Parliamentary oversight of the security and defence sector – Law and practice”, supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
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Think Tank – The role of Independent Research institutes in Public Policy Development
This publication is available only in Montenegrin
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Public-Private Partnerships in Montenegro
Accountability, transparency and efficiency
Although the cooperation between the public and the private sector in developing infrastructural sites dates back to the eighteenth century, it has reached its global expansion and popularisation only in the last decade of the previous century. The intense interactive link between the technically more developed private sector and the public authorities is largely determined by the lack of funds for capital investment in state budgets.
Public-private partnerships (PPP) in Montenegro are increasingly used as a mechanism for covering the budget deficit. Moreover, the government has opted to intensify the use of this model in the privatisation process, thus ‘opening’ all the sectors to PPP. However, as PPP is still in its developmental stage in Montenegro, the projects that have been completed through public-private partnerships do not mirror the positive examples from other European countries. Additionally, although the legislative framework of PPP has been enhanced by the adoption of the 2009 Law on concessions, it is still not fully harmonised with the EU’s directives regulating this area. The lack of harmonisation of legislative acts is most obvious in terms of the imprecise definition of concessions for public works. By the same token, the definitions of limited procedure and competitive dialogue have not been adequately transposed from the EU’s directives.
Despite the relatively high number of PPPs that were realised in Montenegro, the access to information about the contracts concluded is extremely difficult. Thus, there is an obvious need for the establishment of a central register that would contain all the PPP contracts concluded so far. In tandem with the limited transparency of the entire process, there is also a lack of democratic control. The public has no access to the annual payment schemes for PPP projects, and the financial reports of concluded projects are unavailable. Delays in the work of the authority specialised in concessions – the Concessions Commission – is also manifest.
The implementation of PPP has significantly been burdened by the violation of legislative procedures and the preferential treatment of certain private companies, which contributes to the participation of different parties to the tender procedure on an unequal footing. The failure of certain tenders and the problems that have emerged with certain private partners confirm the premature selection of partners and the poor risk assessment of such contracts. Very often, the partners that were preferentially treated during the bidding impose contract conditions, which are accepted and implemented even when they manifestly violate laws. In addition, the details of certain PPP contracts assume the development of infrastructural sites on the locations that are not included in the Spatial Plans.
Montenegro hardly ever relies on the experience of other countries, while failing to participate to the South East European Public Private Partnership Network. The activities of this association should lead to common initiative, so that some common projects could be financed through the EU’s special funds in the future.
At the local level, there is an obvious confusion in the distribution of competences for PPP in Montenegro. In some municipalities there are positions of ‘exclusive negotiators’ with foreign investors.
There is a growing interest in all Montenegrin municipalities for projects modelled after PPP. However, there are many municipalities where PPP has not been implemented so far.
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Public Procurements in Montenegro – Transparency and liability
In 2009, over 433 million euros have been spent on public procurement in Montenegro. Although the public procurement system has been enhanced since its establishment, it still mirrors numerous imperfections related to the untimely and unrealistic planning, incoherence between the procurement contract and the tender requirements, additional changes of the procurement conditions, and the absence of control over the execution of the contract. The lack of transparency and control is particularly emphasised in the phase following the contract assignment. The margin for the development of corruption, especially in relation to additional works is particularly large in this phase. Although numerous irregularities have been pointed to in almost all stages of the public procurement process, disciplinary, misdemeanour or criminal liability has never been established. As a consequence of the different interpretations of the Misdemeanour Act and the Law on Public Procurement, the proceedings for the initiation and determination of misdemeanour liability does not function in practice. The Decision, pursuant to which the contracting authority pays the fine for misdemeanour to the state budget, further undermines misdemeanour proceedings, which are already non-functional. Within three years, the Police Directorate has filed only three criminal cases. In line with our findings, no enforceable court judgments for the abuse of the process of public procurement have been reached so far.
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The Assessment of Legal Framework and Practice in the Implementation of Certain Control Mechanisms of the Parliament of Montenegro (Consultative hearing, control hearing and parliamentary inquiry)
This document analyzes three control mechanisms envisaged in the Constitution of Montenegro and in the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Montenegro: control hearing, consultative hearing, and parliamentary inquiry. Interviews were the methodological tool used in order to obtain information on the attitudes of the key actors in the process of exercising the control function. This envisaged the creation of three separate questionnaires: a) for Representatives and members of parliamentary parties in Montenegro; b) for representatives of institutions that were subject to parliamentary control; c) for journalists who reported on the parliamentary practice and representatives of NGOs dealing with the functioning of the Parliament.
The findings presented in this document are the result of a comprehensive study of the legal framework and practice in Montenegro related to parliamentary control and the implementation of parliamentary mechanisms. The data received from the Parliament’s Service and the organs of state administration were obtained through requests for free access to information.
This document entails some comparative insights based on the analysis of the legal framework and pratice of certain countries from the region and the EU. During the process of research a thorough analysis of legal frameworks has been undertaken (Constitutions and legislative procedures in Parliaments), and coupled with the study of parliamentary practice in these countries. Institute Alternative organized a roundtable, whereby the draft version of this document was debated. Representatives of political parties, non-governmental organizations and media took part at this roundtable. The aims of this project are to enhance the quality of the legal framework and practice in the implementation of control mechanisms of the Parliament of Montenegro, to open a public debate on these issues, and to offer recommendations for improvement.
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Parliamentary oversight of the defense and security sector: What next?
The aim of this paper is to present the key provisions of the applicable legal regulations, strategic and other documents relating to the work of institutions that belong to the defense and security sector in Montenegro. Furthermore, to present recommendations for improving the applicable legal and institutional framework and to encourage public and professional debate.
With this analysis, Institute Alternative wants to contribute to the development of democratic and civilian control of the security sector, provide a contribution to the work of the competent Committee and legislators whose work relates to legislation and policy in the area of defense and security.
This analysis does not have the ambition to provide a comprehensive overview of the practice of democratic and civilian control of defense and security sector, but to draw attention to key issues, problems and dilemmas that occur as a result of the existing legal framework and practice.
The methodology of the work included analysis of legal regulations, comparative analysis of the solutions from the existing legislation and that in parliamentary procedure, collecting official documents through requests for free access to information, interviews with members of the Montenegrin Parliament’s Committee for Defense and Security.
This document addresses responsible persons in the Public Administration that have jurisdiction in the affairs of defense and security, members of the Committee for Defense and Security along with all MPs and interested international, governmental and non-governmental organizations and media.
We expect this analysis to encourage a more competent and intense public and professional debate concerning an important issue for further development of democracy and human rights, accountability and transparency of public institutions.
This analysis represents an introduction into the further work of Institute Alternative on specific issues of defense and security sector oversight.
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The Lipci Case: How not to repeat it
More than a year has passed since the Montenegrin media have started to report about the case of serious devastation of environment in the region of Bay of Kotor (Bokokotorski zaliv), near the small seaside place Lipci, where 4200m2 of the sea area has been illegally banked. After the Ministries and their inspections could not agree upon the issue of who has the jurisdiction over the case for months before the eyes of Montenegrin public, the police has stopped the construction works, prosecutor has raised charges against several persons, and the Basic Court in Kotor has ruled verdicts, sanctioning four persons concerning the case.
However, the question of how was it possible that no state institution, in particular inspection services, did not assumed responsibility for the case and prevent the devastation. Later cases of smaller scale are indicative for assessment that in the meantime, almost nothing has changed.
Therefore, the primary purpose of our research is to provide an answer to the question: What to do so that the Lipci case does not repeat?
With that aim in mind, we want to give the public a comprehensive overview of the case, events, actions of state bodies, statements and activities of other institutions and organizations, and then to determine the key problems, their causes and consequences. At end, we want to offer the public, but first and foremost decision-makers, the proposal to create such a legal framework and ambient that will significantly reduce the possibility of a similar case happening again.
Methodology of the research included analysis of the media reports, access to information in the possession of the state administration as well as the review of the legal framework. Draft version of the document was distributed to certain state administration bodies in order to receive their stances, comments and suggestions. The research was conducted in the period May-October 2009.
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“The Case of the First Bank – The experiences for the supervisor and other decision makers”
The First Bank of Montenegro founded in 1901, the newly acquired name, was an insignificant bank, located in the workers town in the central part of the country until 2006. Next couple of years, this bank succeeded to increase its assets by 24 times, through supervisory non-approved investments in the bank’s share capital from large number of local businessmen and high level political profiles, accompanied by aggressive and not always competitive-driven attraction of deposits from the clients. In less than two years it managed to replace the end of the banks’ market share list with the second place among the reputable and strong competitors. Aggregately, this provincial bank suddenly received abundant funds for unsustainable expansion and implementation of business illusion that only with a strong marketing campaign and with a team of managers who had little or doubtful working experience in banking business could achieve, in very short time, strategically unfeasible ambition to take over the leading role in the banking system.
The first risk-bearing market signs about limited liquidity and solvency of FB MN 1901 were noted in the beginning of 2007; more transparently in the beginning of 2008, as the bank constantly was failing to execute domestic and foreign payments’ orders from clients. Almost by the end of 2008, relevant institutions were too slow and passive to publicly acknowledge the crisis and to face with the system’s disruption caused by the FB MN 1901 insolvency. Furthermore, the situation resulted in systemic risk of the country’s banking sector, that recalled unpleasant memories from the ‘90s when savings “disappeared” from banking balance sheets leaving clients with nominal figures on the accounts, and had strong negative impact on reputation of the country’s overall financial system with significant deposits’ withdrawal.
The legislative solution regarding the protection of banking sector from negative effects of global financial crisis was adopted by the end of the previous year. It provided systemic and regulatory framework for monetary support to FB MN 1901’s liquidity position at the amount of €44 million. The major goals of this facilitation mechanism were: to relax the market and prevent against the panic; to improve confidence and decrease sudden and strong mistrust of clients; to completely execute the domestic and foreign payment’s orders that have been pilled up in the bank’s documentations for several months.
To summarize, semi-decennial national economic reforms strengthened the neo-liberal standing that financial system’s supervision is not necessary and has no market oriented benefits, provided that economic growth will be achieved through significant growth rates, and resulted in full pacification of the national banking sector supervisor from the end of 2006. Therefore, the CBM’s failure of anticipating the roots of the liquidity crisis within the banking system, which originated in FB MN 1901 operations, it could be found surprising from professional point of view, but it had to be systemically and logically expected. Institutional weaknesses and policy limitations in the implementation of CBM competencies have to be subject of future adjustments and corrections, following that Montenegro’s economic system is not yet viable to endure the collapse of the banking business accomplished reforms, which would help to regain and further improve citizens and clients confidence in the country’s banking sector performance.
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Public Administration in Montenegro:
Salary schemes, reward system and opportunities for professional advancement in law and in practice
The process of reform of public administration has been initiated in 2001, in accordance with the Public Administration Reform Strategy in Montenegro 2002-2009. However, the fact that Montenegro should further intensify the reforms of the public administration sector was outlined in the 2007 European Commission Progress Report of the EU, which has marked the country’s public administration as ‘weak and inefficient’. Although the EU has acknowledged that some advancement has been made in this area, further improvements are needed in order to ‘clarify sectoral responsibilities in a manner which permits oversight and transparency.’ Having in mind all of the aforementioned, the purpose of this research is to provide an analysis of the salary schemes, reward system and opportunities for professional advancement in the public administration of Montenegro, both in law and in practice. the process of public administration reform and approximation to eU standards require the establishment of advanced mechanisms for attracting, allocating and rewarding the employees. the poor administrative capacities are one of the key challenges Montenegro is faced with, and this fact is partly attributable to the substandard financial conditions of civil servants and state employees, lack of delegation of responsibility from managers and poor working environment. All of these factors decrease the motivation of the civil servants to give the best contribution at their workplace. this has been confirmed by the Government itself, with the public promise that the situation would improve for the civil servants and the state employees. the attempts to amend the existing Law on Civil Servants and State Employees and the Law on Salaries of Civil Servants and State Employees both resulted in legal uncertainties.
The conundrum created by the current status of these laws outlines the lack of consensus among the policy-makers in Montenegro, the affair being ever more complex given the fact that these policy-makers belong to the same end of the political spectrum. Hence, the aim of this study is to invigorate the current debate on the reform of public administration, and provide for some concrete recommendations for further improvement in this sector. the need for this analysis is further asserted by the fact that the problems in the salary schemes, reward systems and opportunities for professional advancement in public administration have been perpetuating for a long time; and by the fact that so far, no serious analysis of the current state of affairs in public administration has been made, with thus no adequate recommendations offered to the policy-makers.
In order to offer the most comprehensive outlook of the current state of affairs in this area, and the most plausible solutions to the challenges, this paper is divided in four analytical parts, each having a specific scope. the first part of the study gives an overview of the existing legislation, which helps generate the second portion of research dealing with the implementation of reforms in practice. The third part of the study identifies the challenges Montenegro is faced with, in order to be able to give concrete recommendations on how to tackle them. The fourth element of analysis will consider the practices in Montenegro through comparison with Slovenia, Croatia and Malta, countries that have all recently engaged in the process of reform of public administration. The four analytical elements will be synthesised as recommendations at the end of this policy paper.
So as to present an ample overview of the current legal framework, relevant strategies, the applicability of these documents in practice and their effect on the employees, this paper uses the combination of analytical and comparative approaches. Due to such a perspective on research, qualitative methods -including text analysis and interviews with the relevant policy-makers – offer the best explanation for the examined case. the interviewed sample consists of the relevant officials of the ministries in the Government of Montenegro; and civil servants and state employees in the independent agencies and other institutions. these structured interviews are used to show and analyse the effects of the current legislation, as well as the level of the government’s commitment to creating an efficient state administration.
(Click on the photograph above to download the study in .pdf)
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IA was coeditor and one of the publishers of the publication ‘Political criteria in the process of Stabilization and Association of Montenegro to EU’ by Aleksandar Saša Zeković.
(click on the photograph above to download the study – publication is available in Montenegrin-only)
Parlamentarne istrage u Crnoj Gori
Kontrolni mehanizam bez političke podrške
Ustavna mogućnost predlaganja i sprovođenja parlamentarnih istraga u Crnoj Gori gotovo se ne koristi. Ovaj kontrolni mehanizam nije sprovođen u posljednjih deset godina, a od usvajanja važećeg Poslovnika Skupštine, kojim su uređene parlamentarne istrage, samo dva puta je predloženo njihovo otvaranje.
U Crnoj Gori postoji nedostatak političke volje parlamentarne većine za pokretanjem parlamentarnih istraga i nepovjerenje opozicije u mogućnost njihovog realizovanja. Osim toga, opozicija ne djeluje jedinstveno u iniciranju ovog mehanizma. Dodatan problem su i normativni nedostaci sadašnjeg uređenja parlamentarnih istraga u Crnoj Gori. Anketni odbor bi se u sprovođenju parlamentarne istrage mogao suočiti s poteškoćama u prikupljanju podataka zbog: neprecizno definisanih istražnih ovlašćenja; nemogućnosti pristupa tajnim podacima; izostanka zakonske obaveze državnih funkcionera, službenika i drugih lica da budu saslušani pred Odborom pod prijetnjom sankcije za neodazivanje i lažno svjedočenje.
Za razliku od Crne Gore, gdje su parlamentarne istrage uređene Poslovnikom, u velikom broju zemalja Evropske unije regulisane su zakonom, i to najčešće posebnim Zakonom o parlamentarnim istragama. Utvrđivanje posebnog zakonskog okvira za ovaj kontrolni mehanizam ima za cilj njegovo jačanje, kao i garantovanje apsolutne obaveznosti poštovanja odredbi kojima se uređuje. Usvajanjem takvog zakona u Crnoj Gori regulisale bi se pojedinosti djelokruga i djelovanja anketnog odbora, kao i kaznene odredbe, te omogućilo adekvatno sprovođenje ovog mehanizma u praksi.
(Kliknite na fotografiju da preuzmete publikaciju u .pdf-u)
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Zakon o parlamentarnom nadzoru u oblasti bezbjednosti i odbrane
- prva godina primjene -
Monitoring izvještaj za 2011. godinu
U decembru 2010. godine, nakon skoro tri godine od začetka ideje o potrebi njegovog donošenja, u Skupštini Crne Gore jednoglasno je usvojen Zakon o parlamentarnom nadzoru u oblasti bezbjednosti i odbrane. Osnovni cilj zakona je da Skupštini Crne Gore, neposredno i preko Odbora za bezbjednost i odbranu, kroz nadzor nad organima zaduženim za bezbjednost i odbranu, omogući zaštitu sloboda i prava građana od mogućih zloupotreba, te da doprinese izgradnji cjelovitog i savremenog sistema bezbjednosti u Crnoj Gori. Ovim zakonom je definisan način vršenja parlamentarnog nadzora nad radom organa i institucija koji se bave poslovima bezbjednosti i odbrane, njihove dužnosti, kao i odnos Odbora za bezbjednost i odbranu prema Skupštini Crne Gore i Vladi Crne Gore.
Autori ovog dokumenta žele da pruže objektivan i cjelovit prikaz rada Skupštine i Odbora za bezbjednost i odbranu u 2011. godini, koja je važna kao prva godina primjene Zakona o parlamentarnom nadzoru u oblasti bezbjednosti i odbrane. Idući dalje od brojki i statističkih prikaza, ovaj dokument je istovremeno i osvrt na ispunjavanje ključnih nadležnosti koje su date u Zakonu i Poslovniku Skupštine. Takođe, ovaj dokument je za autore bio prilika da istaknu probleme u funkcionisanju parlamentarnog nadzora ovog sektora i dodatno naglase određene nedorečenosti u Zakonu, kojima smo se bavili i u toku njegove izrade.
Institut alternativa želi da ovim izvještajem učvrsti tradiciju rasprave i javnog dijaloga o radu Odbora za bezbjednost i odbranu i, uopšte, o funkcionisanju parlamentarnog nadzora nad sektorom bezbjednosti i odbrane. Ovo je prvi u nizu godišnjih izvještaja kroz koje ćemo pokušati da izgradimo metodologiju praćenja rada Skupštine i Odbora po ovom pitanju, metodologiju “mjerenja” uspjeha u ispunjavanju zakonskih odredbi i pomognemo u procesu planiranja vršenja parlamentarnog nadzora.
(Kliknite na fotografiju da preuzmete publikaciju u .pdf-u)
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Crna Gora pod budnom pažnjom Đukanovića i EU
Promjene u Crnoj Gori se odvijaju sporo, teško i nevoljno. Činjenica da je na mjestu predsjednika Vlade Igor Lukšić još uvijek je manje značajna od činjenice da Milo Đukanović nije predsjednik Vlade, ali je njegov politički uticaj i značaj najveći u zemlji.
Novi premijer je uspostavio praksu komunikacije i saradnje sa opozicijom, nevladinim akterima i drugim društvenim subjektima. Takođe, pokazao je novi politički senzibilitet za rješavanje društvenih problema, drugačiji pristup i metode u radu. Ipak, njegov premijerski angažman još uvijek je u sjenci Đukanovića. Uz ovakvu dinamiku nejasno je da li Lukšić uopšte ima namjeru da postigne određeni stepen autonomije u odlučivanju kao i kada bi se tako nešto uopšte moglo očekivati.
Proces evropskih integracija, odnosno politika uslovljavanja, ključni je faktor ubrzavanja reformi. Bez snažnog uticaja međunarodne zajednice (EU i SAD), u sinergiji sa osnaživanjem uloge nezavisnih i profesionalnih medija i NVO, reforme čiju dinamiku bi diktirala samo Vlada bile bi osuđene na stagnaciju. To pokazuje intenzitet reformskih zahvata koji je postignut, iako uglavnom u sferi pravnih promjena, u izuzetno kratkom periodu pod pritiskom obaveze ispunjavanja sedam preporuka Evropske komisije.
Dugogodišnji kontinuitet iste vlasti je izbrisao liniju između države i dominantne političke partije DPS, pa uobičajene institucije, norme i prakse ne funkcionišu ili daju slabe rezultate u decenijski zamrznutom političkom kontekstu. Ovaj zaključak je najvidljiviji u (slabim rezultatima u) oblasti borbe protiv visoke korupcije i razvoja profesionalne javne uprave – oblastima koje najsnažnije utemeljuju političku elitu.
Krupne odluke od značaja za dalji ekonomski razvoj Crne Gore i dalje se donose sporo ili se uopšte ne donose, a Vlada nije uspijevala da za svoje predloge pridobije podršku javnosti i raširi uvjerenje u transparentnost i odgovornost procesa koje vodi.
Postoji značajna unutarpartijska dinamika u DPS-u koja za posljedicu ima određeni stepen udaljavanja između Đukanovića s jedne, i Marovića i Vujanovića s druge strane. Dok je na površini vidljiva razlika u stavovima o identitetskim pitanjima, gdje se Ranko Krivokapić, predsjednik SDP-a, pojavljuje kao eksplicitni tumač politike samog predsjednika DPS-a, dotle su unutrašnje (interesne) pukotine sve više takve da na srednji rok ugrožavaju monolitnost DPS-a.
Dok u dijelu javnosti postoji očekivanje da će DPS uskoro zahvatiti proces raslojavanja u vrhu rukovodstva, još uvijek je rano govoriti o podjelama i cijepanju partije, iako je gotovo izvjesno da će do određenih modifikacija u partiji doći u relativno skorijem periodu.
Opozicija i dalje ne čini značajne organizacione i strateške korake na unapređenju svojih kapaciteta. Rezultati istraživanja javnog mnjenja govore o pozitivnom trendu rasta DPS-a, i slabom opadanju opozicije, uz značajan rast apstinencije.
Parlamentarni izbori će se moguće organizovati na jesen 2012, a njihovo ranije organizovanje ne bi bilo u korist zahtjevnog šestomjesečnog perioda monitoringa Evropske komisije u susret konačnom otpočinjanju pregovora sa EU.
(Kliknite na fotografiju da preuzmete publikaciju u .pdf-u)
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The Montenegrin parlament in the process of EU integration (English)
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Analiza efekata propisa (RIA) u Crnoj Gori
Crna Gora kao zemlja kandidat za ulazak u Evropsku uniju ima obavezu usklađivanja kompletnog zakonodavstva sa „EU acquis“-em. S obzirom na to da je riječ o velikom broju postojećih zakona koje treba izmijeniti i onih čije usvajanje tek predstoji, državna administracija pred sobom ima zadatak koji podrazumijeva sveobuhvatne reforme. Jedan od mehanizama koji će imati veliki značaj za proces smanjenja administrativnog tereta jeste i uvođenje Analize efekata propisa (RIA).
RIA je metod koji u predzakonodavnoj fazi pomaže usaglašavanju zakona i akata, i to na osnovu jasnog prikaza kakve će finansijske i materijalne posljedice proizvesti novi propisi. Koncept RIA predstavljen je u SAD-u, dok na evropskom kontinentu ima širu primjenu od 2003. godine, kada se implementira na nivou EU. Za razliku od zemalja u okruženju (Srbija i Makedonija), gdje se RIA primjenjuje isključivo na nacrte zakona, u Crnoj Gori će se ovaj mehanizam koristiti i na podzakonske akte.
Cilj ovog Policy Brief-a jeste da objasni sam pojam RIA, njegov značaj, praksu zemalja u okruženju u njenoj primjeni, ali i izazove sa kojima će se susresti naša Vlada prilikom primjene ovog koncepta u praksi. Imajući u vidu da je ovaj proces na samom početku u Crnoj Gori, neophodno je pokrenuti dijalog o dometima i efektima uvođenja i primjene ovog mehanizma, što je i posebna namjena ovog Brief-a.
(Kliknite na fotografiju da preuzmete publikaciju u .pdf-u)
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Kontrola budžeta lokalnih samouprava
Lokalne samouprave na godišnjem nivou troše više od 250 miliona eura.1 Imajući u vidu visinu sredstava kojima na godišnjem nivou raspolažu lokalne samouprave u Crnoj Gori, nesporan je značaj adekvatnog kontrolisanja planiranja, izvršenja i revizije budžeta na lokalnom nivou.
U cilju sagledavanja postojećih mehanizama za kontrolu budžeta na lokalnom nivou, ova analiza će dati presjek pravnog okvira i prakse u vezi s planiranjem, izvršenjem i revizijom budžeta u četiri izabrane crnogorske opštine: Nikšić, Danilovgrad, Podgorica i Herceg Novi.
Završni računi budžeta opština Nikšić, Danilovgrad i Herceg Novi bili su predmet revizije Državne revizorske institucije (DRI), pa su zato ove lokalne samouprave i izabrane za istraživanje, da bi se utvrdilo na koji način ovi izvještaji pomažu unapređenju kontrole budžeta. Glavni grad Podgorica izabran je zbog više aspekata: visine budžeta2, iznosa sredstava koja se opredjeljuju za kapitalne investicije, kao i zbog brojnih polemika koje prenose mediji.
(Kliknite na fotografiju da preuzmete publikaciju u .pdf-u)
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Državna revizija u Crnoj Gori – prijedlozi za jačanje uticaja
Državna revizorska institucija (DRI) samostalan je i vrhovni organ državne revizije, a ustanovljena je donošenjem Zakona o državnoj revizorskoj instituciji, u aprilu 2004. godine, kao institucionalna, eksterna, nezavisna, stručna i objektivna kontrola trošenja budžetskih sredstava i upravljanja državnom imovinom u Crnoj Gori. DRI je do sada objavila 46 izvještaja o reviziji, od kojih su šest izvještaji o reviziji završnog računa budžeta Crne Gore, a ostatak izvještaji o pojedinačnim revizijama. Broj revizija iz godine u godinu se povećava, uz postepeno povećanje kapaciteta DRI i sprovođenje novih, zahtjevnijih vrsta revizija.
U medijima, od strane poslanika, predstavnika izvršne vlasti i međunarodnih organizacija često se mogu čuti pohvale na račun DRI i kvaliteta njenog rada. Do sada nije bilo značajnijeg doprinosa radu DRI od strane nevladinih organizacija u Crnoj Gori.
Rukovodeći se iznijetim stavovima, smatramo da je vrijeme za objektivan pregled dosadašnjeg rada DRI, njenog položaja u institucionalnom okviru, načina na koji su nalazi ove institucije bili korišćeni od strane drugih nadležnih organa i, prije svega, rezultata dosadašnjeg rada. Uz podršku Evropskog fonda za Balkan, Institut Alternativa (IA) sproveo je projekat “Ka najboljoj EU praksi: Jačanje uticaja spoljne finansijske kontrole u Crnoj Gori”. Projekat obuhvata analizu pravnog okvira finansijske kontrole, kapaciteta Državne revizorske institucije (DRI) i kvaliteta međuinstitucionalne saradnje. Cilj projekta jeste dolaženje do preporuka čija će primjena dovesti do unapređenja rada DRI, a time i njenog uticaja na sistem javnih finansija, a ova publikacija treba da promoviše taj cilj i doprinese njegovoj realizaciji.
U izradi ovog istraživačkog izvještaja korišćeni su nalazi iz intervjua s predstavnicima subjekata revizije, DRI, Ministarstva finansija, Državnog tužilaštva, Direkcije za javne nabavke, Područnog organa za prekršaje Podgorica i poslanicima iz Odbora za ekonomiju, finansije i budžet. Korišćen je i materijal sakupljan od strane IA u toku prethodnih godina u vidu press clipping-a, članaka iz štampanih medija na temu državne revizije. Posvećena je pažnja i uporednoj praksi i zakonskim okvirima državne revizije u odabranim zemljama regiona (Hrvatska, BiH i Makedonija). U toku istraživanja uspostavljena je konstruktivna saradnja sa DRI, kojoj je upućen osnovni upitnik sa trideset pitanja, zahtjevi za pristup informacijama, a obavljeni su i intervjui s načelnicima sektora.
Ova analiza sadrži preporuke koje su namijenjene prvenstveno DRI, ali i ostalim učesnicima procesa kontrole javne potrošnje u Crnoj Gori. Pored njene primarne namjene, uticaja na donosioce odluka radi uvođenja novih rješenja u zakonski okvir i praksu, cilj ove analize jeste da obogati fond stručnih radova o oblasti eksterne revizije u Crnoj Gori.
Kako se u 2011. planiraju izmjene i dopune Zakona o DRI, to je prilika da se riješe određena pitanja koja značajno opterećuju dosadašnji rad DRI. Važnost daljeg rada na jačanju kapaciteta DRI istakla je i Evropska komisija u Mišljenju o zahtjevu Crne Gore za članstvo u EU, naglasivši ga kao dio jednog od sedam ključnih prioriteta čijim je ispunjenjem Crna Gora uslovljena u pogledu započinjanja pregovora o članstvu.
(Kliknite na fotografiju da preuzmete publikaciju u .pdf-u)
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Izvještaj o demokratskom nadzoru službi bezbjednosti
Institut alternativa je pripremio prevod “Izvještaja o demokratskom nadzoru službi bezbjednosti” Savjeta Evrope (Venecijanske komisije). Izvještaj je dostavljen svim učesnicima procesa reforme sektora bezbjesnosti i odbrane u Crnoj Gori, uključujući poslanike i predstavnike nadležnih državnih organa. Priprema ova publikacije predstavlja doprinos trenutno oskudnoj bazi prevedenih i dostupnih materijala o demokratskom nadzoru u Crnoj Gori. Institut želi da ovom publikacijom podstakne stručnu debatu i ojača svijest o važnosti ovog pitanja za dalji razvoj demokratije i ljudskih prava, odgovornosti i transparentnosti državnih institucija.
Ova publikacija je pripremljena u okviru projekta “Parlamentarni nadzor sektora bezbjednosti i odbrane – Zakon i praksa”, podržanog od strane Fondacije Fridrih Ebert.
(Kliknite na fotografiju da preuzmete publikaciju u .pdf-u)
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Think Tank – Uloga nezavisnih istraživačkih centara u razvoju javnih politika
U crnogorskom društvu, pa i šire, pojam think tank i uloga ovih organizacija su u većini slučajeva nejasni i dosta neprecizno objašnjeni. S obzirom na to da broj think tank organizacija u poslednjih dvadeset godina raste eksplozivnom brzinom, kao i da njihova uloga u društvu postaje sve značajnija, neophodno je širu javnost upoznati sa osnovnim pojmovima koji se susrijeću u radu nezavisnih centara za istraživanje.
Zbog toga je cilj ove publikacije da pojam, ulogu i značaj, istorijat kao i osnovne segmente rada think tank centara predstavi ne samo donosiocima odluka u Crnoj Gori, već i drugim ekspertima u ovoj i ostalim oblastima, predstavnicima medija i univerzitetskoj (akademskoj) i široj javnosti, kao i svim zainteresovanima. Takođe, specifična namjena ovog teksta je da ukaže na moguće pravce saradnje think tank organizacija i državnih i lokalnih struktura u Crnoj Gori.
(Kliknite na fotografiju da preuzmete publikaciju u .pdf-u)
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Javno-privatna partnerstva u Crnoj Gori
Odgovornost, transparentnost i efikasnost
Mada saradnja između javnog i privatnog sektora u izgradnji infrastrukturnih objekata datira još iz XVIII vijeka, svoju globalnu ekspanziju i popularizaciju doživljava tokom poslednje dekade prošlog vijeka. Intenzivna interaktivna sprega između tehnički razvijenijeg privatnog sektora i javnih vlasti u značajnoj mjeri je određena manjkom sredstava u državnim budžetima za oblast kapitalnih investicija.
Javno-privatna partnerstva (JPP) i u Crnoj Gori su sve češće instrument za popunjavanje budžetskog deficita. Naime, Vlada se opredijelila da ovaj model intenzivnije koristi u okviru procesa privatizacije, pa je, stoga, „otvorila“ sve sektore za JPP. Ipak, oblast JPP je još uvijek u razvojnoj fazi, pa ostvareni projekti javno-privatne saradnje odstupaju u odnosu na pozitivne primjere u evropskim zemljama. Takođe, zakodavni okvir za oblast JPP, mada unaprijeđen usvajanjem Zakona o koncesijama 2009. godine, i dalje nije usklađen sa direktivama EU u ovoj oblasti. Neusklađenost zakonodavnih propisa je primjetna u nepreciznom definisanju koncesija za javne radove, a ni definicije ograničene procedure, kao ni konkurentskog dijaloga nisu na adekvatan način prenijete iz direktiva EU.
U Crnoj Gori, i pored relativno velikog broja ostvarenih JPP, pristup informacijama o zaključenim ugovorima je izuzetno otežan pa je evidentna neophodnost formiranja centralnog registra koji bi sadržao sve dosadašnje ugovore JPP. Osim ograničene transparentnosti cjelokupnog procesa, primjetan je i manjak demokratske kontrole. Javnost nema uvid u plan godišnje otplate dugovanja za JPP projekte, a nedostupni su i finansijski izvještaji realizovanih projekata. Evidentna je i neažurnost u radu specijalizovanog tijela za oblast koncesija, Komisije za koncesije.
Realizacija JPP je značajno opterećena kršenjem zakonskih procedura, favorizovanjem određenih privatnih kompanija, čime se doprinosi neravnopravnom učešću zainteresovanih strana u tenderskoj proceduri. Neuspjeh pojedinih tendera i problemi koji su nastali sa određenim privatnim partnerima ukazuju na ishitren izbor partnera i ujedno nepravilno sagledane rizike zaključivanja ugovora. Nerijetko se dešava da favorizovani privatni partneri nameću uslove ugovora, a ovi uslovi se ispunjavaju čak i kada očigledno krše odredbe zakona. Takođe, detalji određenih ugovora JPP podrazumijevaju izgradnju infrastrukturnih objekata na lokacijama čiju izgradnju Prostorni planovi ne predviđaju.
Crna Gora slabo koristi iskustva drugih zemalja, a ne učestvuje ni u radu Mreže javno-privatnog partnerstva u Jugoistočnoj Evropi. Aktivnosti ove asocijacije bi trebalo da vode zajedničkim inicijativama, pa bi pojedini zajednički projekti u budućnosti mogli biti finansirani iz posebnih fondova Evropske unije.
Na lokalnom nivou u Crnoj Gori primjetna je konfuzija u raspodjeli nadležnosti za oblast JPP, pa se čak u pojedinim opštinama susrijećemo sa pozicijama “ekskluzivnih pregovarača” sa inostranim investitorima.
U svim crnogorskim opštinama postoji izražen interes za projekte po modelu JPP, ali je veliki broj opština u kojima do sada nisu ostvareni projekti JPP.
(Kliknite na fotografiju da preuzmete publikaciju u .pdf-u)
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Javne nabavke u Crnoj Gori – Transparentnost i odgovornost
U Crnoj Gori je na javne nabavke u 2009. godini potrošeno preko 433 miliona evra. Sistem javnih nabavki, mada unaprijeđen od uspostavljanja do danas, i dalje je opterećen brojnim nedostacima koji se odnose na neblagovremeno i nerealno planiranje, nasaglasnost ugovora o nabavkama sa zahtjevima iz tendera, naknadne izmjene uslova nabavke, kao i odsustvo kontrole izvršenja ugovora. Manjak transparentnosti i kontrole posebno je naglašen u fazi nakon dodjele ugovora gdje je i najveći prostor za korupciju, posebno u dijelu naknadnih radova. Iako je ukazivano na brojne nepravilnosti u gotovo svim fazama postupka javnih nabavki, nikada nije utvrđena disciplinska, prekršajna ili krivična odgovornost. Usljed različitih tumačenja zakona o prekršajima i javnim nabavkama, postupak pokretanja i utvrđivanja prekršajne odgovornosti ne funkcioniše u praksi. Rješenje prema kojem prekršajnu kaznu plaća naručilac državnom budžetu dodatno obesmišljava i onako nefunkcionalni prekršajni postupak. U tri godine Uprava policije je podnijela svega tri krivične prijave, a prema našim saznanjima još uvijek nema pravosnažnih sudskih presuda za zloupotrebe u javnim nabavkama.
(Kliknite na fotografiju da preuzmete publikaciju u .pdf-u)
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Procjena pravnog okvira i prakse u primjeni nekih kontrolnih mehanizama Skupštine Crne Gore: konsultativno saslušanje, kontrolno saslušanje i parlamentarna istraga
Ovaj dokument bavi se analizom tri kontrolna mehanizma, koji su predviđeni crnogorskim Ustavom i Poslovnikom Skupštine Crne Gore: kontrolnim i konsultativnim saslušanjem, kao i parlamentarnom istragom.
Kao metodološko sredstvo za dobijanje informacija o stavovima ključnih aktera u procesu obavljanja kontrolne funkcije korišćeni su intervjui. To je podrazumijevalo kreiranje tri upitnika: a) za članove Skupštine i predstavnike parlamentarnih partija u Crnoj Gori, b) za predstavnike institucija koje su bile subjekti primjene nadzorne funkcije parlamenta, c) za novinare koji su izvještavali o praksi parlamenta i predstavnike NVO-a koji se bave djelovanjem parlamenta.
Nalazi u ovom dokumentu su rezultat sveobuhvatne studije zakonskog okvira i prakse u Crnoj Gori koja se tiče parlamentarnog nadzora i korišćenja kontrolnih mehanizama. Podaci od Skupštinske službe i organa državne uprave su dobijeni kroz zahtjeve za pristup informacijama
Dokument sadrži uporedni pregled pravnih okvira i prakse nekih zemalja regiona i Evropske unije. Tokom istraživanja sprovedena je detaljna analiza zakonskog okvira (Ustavi i zakonske procedure u parlamentima) kao i parlamentarne prakse u ovim zemljama. Radna verzija ovog dokumenta bila je predmet rasprave na okruglom stolu u organizaciji Instituta Alternativa, uz prisustvo predstavnika političkih partija, nevladinih organizacija i medija.
Svrha ovog projekta je da unaprijedi kvalitet zakonskog okvira i prakse u primjeni kontrolnih mehanizama Skupštine Crne Gore, da otvori javnu debatu i da preporuke za poboljšanje.
(Kliknite na fotografiju da preuzmete publikaciju u .pdf-u)
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Parlamentarna kontrola sektora bezbjednosti i odbrane u Crnoj Gori – Kako dalje?
Cilj ovog dokumenta je da predstavi ključne odredbe važećih pravnih propisa, strateških i drugih dokumenata koji se odnose na rad institucija koje pripadaju sektoru odbrane i bezbjednosti u Crnoj Gori, predstavi preporuke za unapređenje važećeg pravnog i institucionalnog okvira i podstakne javnu i stručnu debatu.
Institut Alternativa želi da ovom analizom da doprinos razvoju demokratske i civilne kontrole sektora bezbjednosti, pruži doprinos radu nadležnog Odbora kao i zakonodavcima čiji se rad odnosi na pravne propise i politiku u sektoru odbrane i bezbjednosti.
Ova analiza nema ambiciju da pruži sveobuhvatan pregled prakse demokratske i civilne kontrole sektora odbrane i bezbjednosti, već da ukaže na ključna pitanja, probleme i dileme koje se pojavljuju kao rezultat postojećeg pravnog okvira i prakse.
Metodologija rada na analizi je uključila analizu pravnih propisa, uporednu analizu rješenja iz važećeg i zakonodavstva koje je u parlamentarnoj proceduri, prikupljanje zvaničnih dokumenata putem zahtjeva za slobodan pristup informacijama, intervjue sa članovima Odbora za odbranu i bezbjednost Skupštine Crne Gore.
Ovim dokumentom se obraćamo kako odgovornim licima u organima državne uprave koji u nadležnosti imaju poslove bezbjednosti, Odbora za odbranu i bezbjednost, ali i svim poslanicima u Skupštini Crne Gore. zainteresovanim međunarodnim, vladinim i nevladinim organizacijama i medijima.
Očekujemo da ova analiza podstakne kvalitetniju i intenzivniju javnu i stručnu raspravu o značajnom pitanju za dalji razvoj demokratije i ljudskih prava, odgovornosti i transparentnosti rada javnih institucija.
Ova analiza predstavlja uvod u dalji rad Instituta Alternativa na pojedinim specifičnim pitanjima nadzora sektora odbrane i bezbjednosti.
(Kliknite na fotografiju da preuzmete publikaciju u .pdf-u)
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Slučaj Lipci 2008 – Kako da nam se ne ponovi
Nešto više od godinu dana je prošlo od kako je u crnogorskim medijima osvanula priča o slučaju ozbiljne devastacije prirode u reonu Bokokotorskog zaliva, u malom primorskom mjestu Lipci, gdje je nezakonito nasuto 4200 m2 morske površine. Nakon što se mjesecima, pred očima cjelokupne crnogorske i međunarodne javnosti, ministarstva i njihove inspekcije nisu mogle dogovoriti u čijoj nadležnosti je slučaj, policija je zabranila radove, tužilac pokrenuo postupak protiv nekoliko lica, a u septembru ove godine Osnovni sud u Kotoru izrekao je kazne za četiri lica koja je tužilac optužio u ovom slučaju.
Međutim, ostaje pitanje kako je moguće da nijedan državni organ, posebno inspekcijske službe, ne preuzme odgovornost za slučaj i spriječi devastaciju. Kasniji slučajevi manjeg obima, indikativni su za ocjenu da se u međuvremenu malo toga promijenilo.
Zato je osnovna namjera našeg istraživanja da pruži odgovor na pitanje: Kako da nam se ne ponovi slučaj Lipci.
U toj namjeri želimo da pružimo javnosti cjelovit pregled slučaja, događaja, radnji državnih organa, izjava i aktivnosti drugih institucija i organizacija, zatim da utvrdimo ključne probleme, njihove uzroke i posljedice. Na kraju, da ponudimo javnosti, ali prije svega donosiocima odluka, predlog za kreiranje takvog pravnog okvira i ambijenta koji će bitno smanjiti mogućnost da se sličan slučaj ponovi.
Metodologija istrazivanja uključila je analizu izvještavanja medija, pristup informacijama u posjedu državnih organa, analizu pravne regulative. Radna verzija dokumenta distribuirana je određenim državnim organima, kako bi dostavili svoje stavove, komentare i sugestije. Istraživanje je sprovedeno u periodu maj – oktobar 2009.
(Kliknite na fotografiju da preuzmete publikaciju u .pdf-u)
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”Slučaj Prve Banke”
Iskustva za supervizora i ostale nosioce odluka
Do polovine 2006. godine Prva banka Crne Gore, osnovana 1901 je predstavljala malu banku iz radničkog grada centralnog dijela zemlje. U narednih par godina ova banka je uspijela, različitim neprincipijelnim modelima investiranja u kapital banke od strane velikog broja domaćih biznismena i političkih profila, a i uz agresivno, ali ne uvijek poslovno, sakupljanje depozita na tržištu, da se uveća za preko 24 puta, a za manje od dvije godine da začelje tržišnog učešća u sistemu zamijeni drugom pozicijom među konkurentima. Agregatno, ova malena banka iz provincije odjednom dobija značajne fondove za proširenje i implementaciju neodržive zablude da se samo na osnovu sveprisutne marketinške kampanje i uz tim upravljačkih i menadžerskih profila bez podrobnijeg iskustva u praćenju rasta bankom, može ostvariti, u veoma kratkom roku, strateški nefizibilna ambicija preuzimanja liderskog mjesta u bankarskom sistemu.
Polovinom 2007. godine, a značajnije, transparentnije i jasnije početkom 2008. godine, uočavaju se prvi strukturniji tržišni signali o limitiranoj likvidnosti PB CG 1901, koja je najjače bila izražena kroz nerealizaciju naloga domaćeg i inostranog platnog prometa. Javno suočavanje sa poremećajem ugrožavanja ukupne likvidnosti PB CG 1901 se institucionalno prihvata relativno kasno, krajem oktobra 2008. godine, čime se ukupni bankarski sektor dovodi u stanje sistemskog rizika koje je ličilo na početke 90-tih, i time imalo snažan negativan reputacioni efekat na ukupan finansijski sistem zemlje.
Krajem 2008. godine, donosi se zakonsko rješenje o zaštiti bankarskog sektora od negativnih efekata globalne finansijske krize, koji obezbjeđuje sistemske i regulatorne mehanizme za odobrenje kreditne podrške PB CG 1901 u vrijednosti od €44 miliona, s ciljem umirenja ukupnog tržišta i zaustavljanja panike; smanjenja nepovjerenja komitenata; izvršenja nagomilanih naloga unutrašnjeg i inostranog platnog prometa koji su, niz mjeseci ranije, bili slagani u dokumentaciji banke.
Sistemski rekapitulirano, u posljednjih pet godina ukupnih reformi nacionalne ekonomije institucionalno/politički kontinuirano je jačala opcija neoliberalnog promišljanja da je supervizija finansijskog sitema nepotrebna, što je na kraju rezultiralo pasiviziranjem nacionalnog regulatora banaka već krajem 2006. godine. Stoga je neuspješnost CB CG da anticipira autohtone uzroke krize likvidnosti unutar bankarskog sektora zemlje, izazavane krizom u PB CG 1901, stručno iznenađujuća, ali sistemski očekivana. Uočeni institucionalni nedostaci u sprovođenju ovlašćenja se mogu i moraju ispravljati pošto ekonomski sistem Crne Gore nema kapacitete da istrpi urušavanje postignutih nivoa bankarskog poslovanja, jer se samo na taj način održava i produbljuje povjerenje koje građani još uvijek imaju prema bankarskom sektoru zemlje.
(Kliknite na fotografiju da preuzmete publikaciju u .pdf-u)
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